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After Suffrage: The Unfinished Business of Feminist 
Legal Advocacy 
Serena Mayeri 
abstract.  This Essay considers post-suffrage women’s citizenship through the eyes of Pauli 
Murray, a key figure at the intersection of the twentieth-century movements for racial justice and 
feminism. Murray drew critical lessons from the woman suffrage movement and the Reconstruc-
tion-era disintegration of an abolitionist-feminist alliance to craft legal and constitutional strate-
gies that continue to shape equality law and advocacy today. Murray placed African American 
women at the center of a vision of universal human rights that relied upon interracial and inter-
generational alliances and anticipated what scholars later named intersectionality. As Murray fore-
saw, women of color formed a feminist vanguard in the second half of the twentieth century, pio-
neering social movements and legal claims that enjoyed significant success. But Murray’s hope that 
women’s solidarity could overcome ideological divides and the legacy of white supremacy went 
unfulfilled. As a result, the more expansive visions of racial, sexual, economic, and reproductive 
justice that intersectional advocacy produced remain the most pressing unfinished business of sex 
equality today, at the Nineteenth Amendment’s centennial. 
introduction 
The Nineteenth Amendment’s passage and ratification left much business 
unfinished. For many American women, the Amendment failed to confer suf-
frage. Poll taxes, literacy tests, white primaries, and the threat of economic re-
prisals and violence kept African American women and men from vindicating 
their constitutional right to vote.1 And for American women generally, voting 
 
1. The disenfranchisement of Native Americans as well as some Asian and Latinx Americans 
persisted, too. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvi, 123-24 (rev. ed. 2018); Maggie Blackhawk, Federal 
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rights comprised only part of the full enfranchisement suffragists and other ad-
vocates for women’s equal citizenship sought.2 
Prompted by movements for racial justice, the rights revolution that began 
in the mid-twentieth century extended voting rights to African American women 
and men forty-five years after the Nineteenth Amendment; gave people of color 
some legal tools to pursue equal opportunity in education and employment; 
opened public accommodations; and allowed for greater civic participation by 
persons formerly excluded on the basis of race. After the realization of universal 
adult citizen suffrage in 1965, feminist, antiracist, and economic-justice advo-
cates pressed beyond the vote, seeking to fulfill the broader visions of freedom 
and equality long bound up with quests for universal suffrage. 
This Essay begins by considering post-suffrage women’s citizenship from the 
vantage point of a central figure at the intersection of the civil-rights and feminist 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s: Pauli Murray. Murray, whose posthumously 
published autobiography’s subtitle described her as a “Black activist, feminist, 
lawyer, priest and poet,” was a largely unsung architect of second-wave femi-
nism’s legal and constitutional strategy.3 Her theories and strategies anticipated 
elements of what legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw later named intersectional-
ity.4 From the woman suffrage movement that culminated in the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s passage and ratification, Murray drew crucial lessons about 
 
Indian Law as Paradigm Within American Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1843-45 (2019); 
see also infra note 38 (explaining barriers faced by Asian and other non-European immigrants). 
On disability and suffrage, see RABIA BELT, DISABLING DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: DISABILITY, 
CITIZENSHIP, SUFFRAGE, AND THE LAW, 1819-1920 (forthcoming). 
2. See Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE 
L.J.F. 450, 459-60 (2020); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex 
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 951-52 (2002); Martha S. Jones, 
How Black Suffragists Fought for the Right to Vote and a Modicum of Respect, 40 HUMANITIES, 
Summer 2019, https://www.neh.gov/article/how-black-suffragists-fought-right-vote-and 
-modicum-respect [https://perma.cc/9L86-WH2C]. 
3. Scholarly attention to Murray has accelerated in recent years. See, e.g., SARAH AZARANSKY, THE 
DREAM IS FREEDOM: PAULI MURRAY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC FAITH (2011); PATRICIA 
BELL-SCOTT, THE FIREBRAND AND THE FIRST LADY: PORTRAIT OF A FRIENDSHIP: PAULI MUR-
RAY, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (2016); BRITTNEY C. 
COOPER, BEYOND RESPECTABILITY: THE INTELLECTUAL THOUGHT OF RACE WOMEN (2017); 
GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1919-
1950 (2008); KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAWYER (2012); SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011); ROSALIND ROSENBERG, JANE CROW: THE LIFE OF PAULI 
MURRAY (2017); ANNE FIROR SCOTT, PAULI MURRAY & CAROLINE WARE: FORTY YEARS OF LET-
TERS IN BLACK AND WHITE (2006). 
4. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 
139 (1989). 
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interracial coalition, universal human rights, and the centrality of “Negro 
women” to struggles for racial justice and sex equality. Through legal, constitu-
tional, and political strategies that linked racial, gender, and economic justice, 
Murray and other black feminist leaders built alliances with civil-rights organi-
zations and with predominantly white women’s groups and sought to place Af-
rican American women—including lawyers, activists, theorists, grassroots or-
ganizers, and ordinary citizens—at the center of movement strategy. They 
fought for jury service and criminal justice, freedom from reproductive control 
and access to health care, equal employment opportunity, an end to sexual ex-
ploitation and violence, welfare rights and living wages, support for mothers’ 
roles as caregivers and breadwinners, and a vision of sexual and economic citi-
zenship that embraced parents and children regardless of marital or birth status. 
However, feminists faced formidable obstacles. The 1965 Moynihan Report 
encapsulated the dominant consensus among both liberal and conservative pol-
icy-makers, which blamed the “Negro family’s” “matriarchal” structure for the 
“cultural pathology” afflicting impoverished urban black communities and saw 
the restoration of the patriarchal family as the key to racial progress.5 Over the 
following decades, a right-wing resurgence, fueled by movements for racial re-
trenchment and against feminism, realigned American electoral politics and ren-
dered all three branches of government increasingly inhospitable to progressive 
aims. Though her vision of a civil-rights-feminist coalition and black female 
leadership bore fruit, Murray’s hope that southern white women would lend a 
moderating voice to racial politics went largely unrealized. 
Feminists won some significant victories after suffrage,6 often buoyed by Af-
rican American women’s pioneering advocacy. Civil-rights and feminist activists 
formed fragile but important coalitions. Despite these efforts, a century after the 
Nineteenth Amendment and more than fifty years after suffrage became a reality 
for adult U.S. citizens, the more expansive visions of racial, sexual, economic, 
and reproductive justice that flourish at the intersections remain the most urgent 
unfinished business of sex equality. 
 
5. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE 
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29-40 (1965). 
6. I follow Martha Jones and others in dating the achievement of women’s suffrage to the 1965 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act. See Martha S. Jones, How the Daughters and Granddaugh-
ters of Former Slaves Secured Voting Rights for All, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 8, 2019), https:// 
www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-daughters-and-granddaughters 
-former-slaves-secured-voting-rights-all-180971660 [https://perma.cc/PEM4-TVYH] (not-
ing that the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment “was but a brief pause in [black 
women’s] ongoing struggle for voting rights”). 
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i .  the lost promise of the suffrage movement 
When Pauli Murray conceived a new strategy to realize the promise of equal 
citizenship for women in the early 1960s, the woman-suffrage movement pro-
vided an inspirational but cautionary tale. The activism that culminated in the 
passage and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment began in the crucible of 
abolitionism. Leading white advocates for woman suffrage, such as Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, found their political voices in antislavery agitation, articulating a 
critique of women’s legal, political, and social subordination in documents such 
as the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments signed at Seneca Falls.7 Among the pro-
ponents of women’s enfranchisement were Sojourner Truth and Frederick 
Douglass, giants in the African American freedom struggle.8 African American 
woman suffragist Frances Ellen Watkins Harper called for the inclusion of black 
women “as part of ‘one great privileged nation’” of enfranchised persons. She 
declared: “We are all bound up in one great bundle of humanity, and society 
cannot trample on the weakest and feeblest of its members without receiving the 
curse of its own soul.”9 
But the abolitionist-feminist alliance did not survive Reconstruction. Suffra-
gists lost a hard-fought battle to enfranchise women: the Fourteenth Amend-
ment introduced the word “male” into the Constitution, penalizing states that 
denied male citizens the vote with a reduction in representation, and the Fif-
teenth Amendment prohibited abridgement of voting rights based on race but 
not sex.10 Over the following decades, some leading white suffragists advocated 
women’s enfranchisement as an antidote to the voting power of black, immi-
grant, poor, and disabled men and rebuffed African Americans who continued 
to fight for women’s right to vote.11 
For Murray, the story of a universalist human-rights movement splintering 
into factions that elevated one claim (black male suffrage) over another (enfran-
chisement of all women and men) had a familiar ring.12 Murray had struggled 
 
7. Siegel, supra note 2, at 459-60. 
8. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 68-70 (2d ed. 1999); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, 
SOJOURNER TRUTH: A LIFE, A SYMBOL 220-21 (1996). 
9. Jones, supra note 6. 
10. DUBOIS, supra note 8, at 163. 
11. ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 
1850-1920, at 161-66 (1998). 
12. Works that informed Murray’s understanding of the woman’s suffrage movement included 
GUNNAR MYRDAL, 2 AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOC-
RACY 1073-78 (1944); and ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1959). 
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against what she called “Jane Crow” since law school, where she faced prejudice 
from her male Howard classmates and professors and outright exclusion from 
Harvard Law School when she applied for a fellowship traditionally awarded to 
Howard’s top graduate.13 Murray immediately likened Harvard’s 1944 edict—
”members of your sex are not admitted to the University”—to the University of 
North Carolina’s refusal to consider her application to its graduate program in 
sociology six years earlier, because of her race. She resolved to fight the “twin 
immoralities” of Jim and Jane Crow.14 
In 1962, Murray seized her chance: as a member of the Civil and Political 
Rights Committee of the President’s Commission on the Status of Women, she 
wrote a founding document of modern feminist constitutionalism.15 Advocates 
for women divided, sometimes bitterly, over the proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment (ERA), while opponents worried that formal legal equality would van-
quish hard-won protective labor legislation for women. Some leaders in the pro-
ERA National Woman’s Party (NWP) saw racial-justice movements as compet-
itors, even antagonists. Murray’s memorandum tacitly mended both rifts: she 
recommended that advocates organize an “NAACP for women” and pursue 
equal-rights litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment in a strategy modeled 
on the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s campaign against racial segregation.16 
The following year, Murray authored another pivotal memorandum defend-
ing a proposed amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on sex.17 When NWP leaders and some congresswomen 
declared the provision necessary to protect “white, Christian women of United 
 
13. Mary Elizabeth Basile, Pauli Murray’s Campaign Against Harvard Law School’s “Jane Crow” Ad-
missions Policy, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 77, 79-80 (2007); PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY 
THROAT: MEMOIR OF AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE 147-67, 308-16 (1987); J. CLAY SMITH, JR., RE-
BELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 79-83 (1998). 
14. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147-67, 308-16; ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 339 (quoting State-
ment of Pauli Murray on the Equal Rights Amendment (S.J. Res. 61) submitted to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee 5 (Sept. 16, 1970) (Pauli Murray Papers, Box 89, Folder 1542V, on file 
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University)). 
15. Pauli Murray, A Proposal to Reexamine the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
State Laws and Practices Which Discriminate on the Basis of Sex Per Se 10 (Dec. 1, 1962) 
(President’s Commission on the Status of Women Papers, Doc. II-20, Box 8, Folder 62, on 
file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University). 
16. Id. 
17. Pauli Murray, Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title VII 
(Equal Employment Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Sex, in 
HOW AND WHY WAS FEMINIST LEGAL STRATEGY TRANSFORMED, 1960-1973?, at 4 (Serena 
Mayeri ed., 2007). 
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States origin”18 from discrimination and many civil-rights sympathizers warned 
that the amendment would sink the civil-rights bill, Murray reframed the debate. 
Without a sex amendment, Murray warned, Title VII would “offer genuine 
equality of opportunity to only half of the potential Negro work force,” leaving 
“both Negro and white women” to “share a common fate of discrimination.”19 
Murray’s theory of politics placed “Negro women” at the center of struggles for 
justice that often pitted “Negroes” against “women” as if these were mutually 
exclusive categories. 
The post-Civil War abolitionist/feminist split over suffrage informed Mur-
ray’s approach to law reform and constitutional change, and imbued her efforts 
to unite racial justice and women’s rights with special urgency. Murray believed 
that “the rights of women and the rights of Negroes are only different phases of 
the fundamental and indivisible issue of human rights.”20 “American history” 
taught the “costly lesson” that “human rights” could not “be affirmed for one 
social group and ignored in the case of another without tragic consequences.”21 
Murray saw the failure to achieve woman suffrage after the Civil War as es-
pecially fateful. Not only had many Republicans and male abolitionists betrayed 
the cause of universal enfranchisement, but African Americans lost valuable po-
tential allies in disenfranchised white southern women; had women won the 
vote in 1870, Murray suggested, their “political emancipation . . . might well 
have eased the transition from a slave society to a society of free men and 
women.”22 Specifically, “[p]olitical power in the hands of white women . . . 
could have reduced the fear of ‘Negro domination’” in the defeated South and 
mitigated post-Reconstruction racial retrenchment.23 Murray even cited a “sharp 
drop in lynching” after pass of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 to support 
her contention that white female voters exerted a progressive influence on the 
politics of race.24 
Murray invoked universal suffrage’s failure in the 1860s to promote a “natu-
ral alli[ance]” between “women” and “disadvantaged minorities” a century 
 
18. Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 770-71 (2004). For more on Murray’s memo, see, e.g., Serena Mayeri, 
Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 718-21 (2015). 
19. Murray, supra note 17, at 20-21. 
20. Id. at 9. 
21. Id. She warned, “Whenever political expediency has dictated that the recognition of basic hu-
man rights be postponed, the resulting dissension and conflict has been aggravated.” Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 11. 
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later.25 The “bitter memories” of the Reconstruction-era fracture made (white) 
women “understandably apprehensive and resentful of any proposed legislation 
which may appear to grant rights to Negroes at the expense of their own rights,” 
Murray wrote.26 Her memo appealed to lawmakers’ “statesmanship” to “prevent 
a possible injustice” by banning sex discrimination.27 To skeptical civil-rights 
and labor leaders, Murray evoked common understandings of how employers—
and politicians—pitted vulnerable groups against one another, from enslaved 
and free (white) workers, to immigrant and native-born laborers, to “Negro 
strikebreakers” and underpaid women who kept wages low. 
Murray’s efforts were at once savvy and sincere: in her work as an advocate 
for workers, criminal justice, civil rights, and other progressive causes, she had 
long cultivated close personal friendships and intellectual partnerships with 
white as well as black women.28 Murray’s calls for a coalition between white 
women and people of color spoke to multiple audiences: civil-rights leaders wary 
of white feminists’ flirtations with segregationists; white women preoccupied 
with sex equality at the expense of racial justice; black and working-class women 
skeptical that women’s interests aligned across race and class.29 By identifying 
intersecting axes of inequality, Murray sought to persuade those who believed 
their interests to be divergent that they shared a common cause.30 
For Murray, the position of “Negro women” provided the most urgent illus-
tration of sexual and racial injustice. Long before scholars spoke of intersection-
ality, Murray theorized how women of color shouldered uniquely heavy burdens 
and provided underappreciated leadership in movements for racial justice and 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 12. 
27. Id. at 13. 
28. See, e.g., BELL-SCOTT, supra note 3; SCOTT, supra note 3. 
29. Murray had long called on women as a group to exercise their majority voting strength in 
favor of progressive racial and social policies. See, e.g., Says Yearly Brotherhood Meetings Are Not 
Enough, ALA. TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 1947, at 7 (quoting Murray as telling an interracial group that 
“women’s organizations in particular must participate in programs of social and legislative 
action” against racial prejudice and discrimination). 
30. As Dorothy Roberts explains, “One of the important things about how power operates inter-
sectionally . . . is that it has a way of making people not see the power itself. In other words, 
the intersectional nature of structures of power has a way of leaving certain people out, mar-
ginalizing certain people, but also making people who are disadvantaged by power structures 
not see how it’s in their interest to fight these structures in coalition with others.” Email from 
Dorothy Roberts, Prof., University of Pennsylvania Law, to Author (Dec. 7, 2019, 3:12 PM 
EST) (on file with author) (echoing remarks made at the University of Pennsylvania Law 





women’s liberation.31 “[T]he Negro woman,” she wrote, “has less chances of 
finding a mate, remains single longer and in higher incidence, bears more chil-
dren, is in the labor market longer, has less education, earns less, is widowed 
earlier and carries a heavier economic burden as a family head.”32 Without pro-
tection from antidiscrimination laws, black women could not provide necessary 
support for themselves or their families. To advocates concerned that antidis-
crimination laws might demolish sex-specific protective labor legislation, Mur-
ray’s focus on African American women who toiled to provide both support and 
care to their families highlighted the plight they shared with other working-class 
women.33 
Impelled by the historical memory of the woman-suffrage split, Murray’s 
activism and writings in the 1960s and early 1970s endeavored to bridge gaps 
between movements for racial justice and for sex equality. Murray emphasized 
the centrality of women’s activism to racial-justice movements and protested the 
exclusion of black women from the speakers’ dais at the 1963 March on Wash-
ington, declaring: “The Negro woman can no longer postpone or subordinate 
the fight against discrimination because of sex to the civil rights struggle but 
must carry on both fights simultaneously,” because women’s “full participation 
and leadership” was “necessary to the success of the civil rights revolution.”34 
And she adamantly refused to subordinate or subdivide her complex identities 
as a “Negro woman” of mixed racial heritage, a civil-rights lawyer, a labor 
 
31. On African American women’s civil-rights activism during this period, see, for example, 
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND 
SEX IN AMERICA (1985); BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER AND THE BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT: 
A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC VISION (2003); SISTERS IN THE STRUGGLE: AFRICAN AMERICAN 
WOMEN IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS-BLACK POWER MOVEMENTS (Bettye Collier-Thomas & V.P. 
Franklin eds., 2001); REBECCA TUURI, STRATEGIC SISTERHOOD: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF 
NEGRO WOMEN IN THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE (2018); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, TOO 
HEAVY A LOAD: BLACK WOMEN IN DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES, 1894-1994 (1999). 
32. Murray, supra note 17, at 21. 
33. On the diverse and complicated positions working-class and labor-union women took in de-
bates about workplace protections and antidiscrimination laws, see DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, 
THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN 
AMERICA (2004); Deborah Dinner, Equal by What Measure? The Lost Struggle for Universal State 
Protective Labor Standards, in VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 283 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Jonathan W. Fineman eds., 2018). 
34. Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman in the Quest for Equality, ACORN, July 1964, at 5. The Pitts-
burgh Courier paraphrased Murray as saying in a November 1963 speech that “often women 
prefer their independence to marriage, and thus often mother ‘illegitimate children’ with no 
effort to identify fathers.” Robert L. Robinson, Rights Heads Accused of Sex Discrimination Snub 
Women in Top Ranks, Says Educator, PITTSBURGH COURIER, Nov. 23, 1963, at 4. 
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advocate, and a champion of universal human rights.35 To the reawakening fem-
inist movement she brought the legacy of racial-justice activism, calling for a 
women’s March on Washington if the EEOC failed to enforce Title VII’s sex dis-
crimination prohibition.36 When racial, generational, and ideological differences 
threatened to divide feminists, Murray urged intergenerational and interracial 
alliances. 
i i .   after suffrage:  the black feminist vanguard 
The passage of Title VII, by linking the fates of race- and sex-discrimination 
law, eventually enabled a fragile but potent coalition between “women and mi-
norities,” civil-rights and feminist movements.37 Even so, Murray’s vision of 
equal citizenship for women faced formidable obstacles. Almost a half-century 
after the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification and nearly a century after the Fif-
teenth’s, African American women and men in the south possessed only nominal 
suffrage rights.38 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, the culmination of decades of 
activism, finally delivered on the promise of universal adult suffrage. 
But even those who embraced civil rights and voting rights clung to a gen-
dered family political economy that rewarded households headed by a male 
breadwinner and a female homemaker and caregiver. The 1965 Moynihan Re-
port crystallized this liberal consensus, which held that the first line of defense 
against a “matriarchal” family structure that bred poverty, “illegitimacy,” and vi-
olence was the restoration of African American men to their proper role as heads 
of households.39 In short, many civil-rights leaders and policy-makers saw equal 
opportunity for women as a threat rather than a boon to the cause of racial equal-
ity. 
 
35. See, e.g., SUSAN HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISH-
MENT 190 (1998) (describing Murray’s concern that “a movement ‘confined almost solely to 
“women’s rights” without strong bonds with other movements toward human rights . . . 
might develop into a head-on collision’ with black liberation initiatives, as had happened after 
the Civil War when some white feminists had advanced their claim to suffrage ahead of that 
of black men”). 
36. Edith Evans Asbury, Protest Proposed on Women’s Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1965, at 32. 
37. NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 
117-54 (2006); MAYERI, supra note 3, at 41-75; Mayeri, supra note 18, at 769-77. 
38. Asian and other non-European immigrants confronted often insuperable barriers to entry and 
naturalization, a prerequisite to suffrage and many other rights and opportunities. See, e.g., 
MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 
(2004); KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN 
AMERICA, 1600-2000 (2015). 
39. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, supra note 5. 
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Murray and other feminists resisted the Moynihan Report’s analysis and ad-
vanced their own vision of the relationship between racial progress, sex equality, 
family structure, and state action.40 They fought women’s subordination in ed-
ucation, employment, jury service, political participation, and office-holding, as 
well as in marriage and family life. African American women formed a vanguard 
of feminist activism and legal advocacy on each of these fronts.41 Their efforts 
met with mixed success. Many signature feminist legal victories are rooted in 
intersectional advocacy. So is much of the unfinished business of sex equality. 
A. Intersectional Advocacy in Jury Service, Politics, and Employment 
The culmination of black women and men’s activism in the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 seemed to secure universal adult citizen suffrage at long last. But 
voting rights, crucial as they were, did not exhaust demands for full enfranchise-
ment and civic participation. State-level de jure exclusion of (all) women and de 
facto exclusion of black men from juries had long prevented defendants from 
receiving fair trials and denied equal citizenship to white women and persons of 
color.42 In 1965, Pauli Murray and ACLU stalwart Dorothy Kenyon championed 
the cause of voting-rights organizer Gardenia White and other black women ex-
cluded from the all-white, all-male jury that acquitted the accused murderers of 
a civil-rights worker.43 Their efforts to overturn outright bans on women’s jury 
service succeeded in 1966 when a three-judge federal district court declared Al-
abama’s law a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A panel that included 
Judges Frank M. Johnson, Jr. and Richard Rives, judicial champions of civil 
rights, accepted Murray’s and Kenyon’s argument that exclusions based on sex, 
as well as those based on race, contravened the Constitution.44 The state’s deci-
sion not to appeal dashed Murray’s hope for a landmark Supreme Court sex-
discrimination ruling on par with Brown.45 She had hoped that such a decision 
would spotlight how racial discrimination intersected with the paternalistic as-
sumptions about gender and family roles that stunted women’s participation in 
public life. 
 
40. See Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), B.U. L. REV. 729, 
735-36 (2013). 
41. MAYERI, supra note 3, at 90-105, 144-85. 
42. On women’s jury service, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: 
WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, 124-220 (1998). 
43. Id. at 197-99; MAYERI, supra note 3, at 26-29; ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 293-96. 
44. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
45. MAYERI, supra note 3, at 29. 
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Lillie Willis’s case illuminated the stakes of jury service for African Ameri-
cans’ political participation and activism. Willis, head of the local chapter of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, faced charges of perjury and forgery re-
lated to her mother’s attempt to register to vote; she had also “been active in 
seeing that the children of plantation workers and displaced farm hands enrolled 
in formerly all-white schools in Mississippi.”46 Twenty-eight-year-old Eleanor 
Holmes Norton, an African American attorney whom Murray had mentored at 
Yale Law School, helped draft a brief challenging the exclusion of black men and 
all women from the jury pool in Sharkey County, Mississippi.47 The Willis fam-
ily paid a steep price for their multi-generational activism. Jennie Joyce Willis, 
Lillie Willis’s thirteen-year-old daughter, lost her right eye to gunfire when she 
stepped outside her home on Thanksgiving Day in 1966. Her mother suspected 
that the bullet was meant for her, though Jennie, too, was a civil-rights activist 
in her own right, having attempted to register for seventh grade at a local all-
white elementary school earlier that fall.48 “My daughter has lost an eye, and I’ve 
got something to work for—freedom,” Lillie Willis told reporters.49 
Murray also saw sex and racial equality in jury service as essential to fairness 
for black defendants. Murray’s advocacy for Odell Waller, an African American 
man sentenced to death for the murder of his white employer, helped steer her 
toward a career in law.50 Just as excluding women, black and white, from suf-
frage impeded racial progress, so too did all-male juries reduce the chances for 
African American men and women to receive fair trials. Opening jury service to 
women generally, Murray hoped, would serve the goal of race- as well as sex-
blind criminal justice.51 
Murray and other feminists also continued to emphasize how the full enfran-
chisement of women required much more than the ballot:52 on the fiftieth anni-
versary of the Nineteenth Amendment, for instance, Murray called for “qualified 
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women” to hold high offices, including the presidency, at least one-third of con-
gressional seats, and a minimum of three or four seats on the Supreme Court.53 
Women’s representation in high office fell far short of Murray’s goal: few 
women, and even fewer women of color, served in Congress in the 1960s and 
early 1970s.54 But a reinvigorated women’s movement backed a growing contin-
gent of feminist lawmakers who sponsored a raft of legislation designed to en-
hance women’s legal status.55 Representative Patsy Takemoto Mink (D-HI), the 
first nonwhite woman elected to Congress, championed the rights of immi-
grants, people of color, labor-union members, and poor and low-income Amer-
icans.56 She sponsored women’s rights legislation, including the Child Care De-
velopment Act of 1971 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.57 The 
National Women’s Political Caucus, established in 1971, included elected officials 
such as Representative Shirley Chisholm (D-NY), the Brooklyn-born daughter 
of Caribbean parents who became the first black woman elected to Congress in 
1968 after winning unemployment benefits for domestic workers58 and defeat-
ing an English-only literacy test in the New York State Assembly.59 A founding 
member of the Congressional Black Caucus, Chisholm helped lead the nearly 
successful effort to pass a universal child-care bill and became the first woman 
to mount a nationwide campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, in 
1972.60 Mink and Chisholm often partnered with Representative Bella Abzug 
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(D-NY), a labor and civil-rights lawyer who fought hard for the Equal Rights 
Amendment and introduced some of the first federal gay-rights legislation in 
1974.61 
Intersectional advocacy also left a lasting mark on employment discrimina-
tion law, as women of color frequently pioneered new claims. Many of the earli-
est sexual-harassment cases, for example, featured African American female 
plaintiffs who may have seen in men’s abuses of power in the workplace echoes 
of the exploitation and violence suffered by their forebears under slavery and Jim 
Crow. Kimberlé Crenshaw later speculated that the “racialization of sexual har-
assment” may account for Black women’s “disproportionate represent[ation] in 
these cases. . . . Racism may provide the clarity to see that sexual harassment 
is . . . an intentional act of sex discrimination.”62 As chair first of the New York 
City Human Rights Commission and later of the EEOC, Eleanor Holmes Nor-
ton became one of the first government officials to champion the recognition and 
remediation of sexual harassment.63 Anita Hill’s 1991 testimony at Clarence 
Thomas’s confirmation hearings awakened the nation to the prevalence and 
wrongfulness of sexual harassment and underscored black women’s longstand-
ing vanguard position in the feminist movement.64 
B. Family Status, Economic Citizenship, and Sexuality 
Full citizenship, sex-equality advocates emphasized, required what Murray 
called a “human rights revolution” that touched every aspect of public and pri-
vate life.65 As the “personal” became “political,” in the parlance of the period, 
feminists such as Murray and Eleanor Holmes Norton inverted Moynihan’s 
thinking to argue that the more equal partnerships enjoyed by black couples 
could serve as models for white families by using their “head start on egalitarian 
family life” to “pioneer in establishing new male-female relationships around 
 
Invisibility in the 1970s: Race, Region, and Representations of Patsy Takemoto Mink, Presen-
tation at the American Historical Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2017). 
61. LEANDRA ZARNOW, BATTLING BELLA: THE PROTEST POLITICS OF BELLA ABZUG (2019). 
62. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1469-70 
(1992); see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 127-41 (1979); Carrie N. Baker, Race, Class, and Sexual Harassment in 
the 1970s, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 7 (2004). 
63. On the emergence of activism against sexual harassment, see CARRIE N. BAKER, THE 
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1998). 
64. Id. at 183. 
65. Anthony B. Pinn, Introduction, in PAULI MURRAY: SELECTED SERMONS AND WRITINGS, at 182 
(Anthony B. Pinn ed., 2006). 
after suffrage 
525 
two careers,” in Norton’s words.66 Women’s full participation in the public 
spheres of work and politics, and men’s involvement in family care, they insisted, 
was integral rather than antithetical to racial progress.67 
This vision of egalitarian marriage informed Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 1970s 
litigation campaign and produced many of the period’s landmark constitutional 
sex-equality decisions. In the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson, the Supreme 
Court held that the government could not offer military housing and health ben-
efits to all servicemen’s wives by default but require that husbands of service-
women prove their dependency to establish eligibility.68 Two years later in Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, a majority of the Justices accepted Ginsburg’s argument that 
denying “mother’s insurance benefits” to surviving widowers devalued their de-
ceased wives’ work in support of their families.69 By the end of the decade, hus-
bands and wives had become almost functionally interchangeable spouses in the 
eyes of the law, though certainly not in the lived realities of American families.70 
Less coordinated, less visible, and ultimately less successful were efforts to 
challenge the legal supremacy of marriage itself.71 Women of color led grassroots 
efforts to advance racial, gender, and economic justice for poor and low-income 
nonmarital families, whose numbers grew in the second half of the twentieth 
century.72 Welfare-rights activists such as Johnnie Tillmon sought to liberate 
women from a Hobson’s choice between depending on a man, relying on stingy 
public assistance, or offering backbreaking labor in exchange for low wages and 
unrelenting poverty.73 Tillmon’s National Welfare Rights Organization de-
manded the right to a minimum income that would allow women to bear and 
raise children outside of marriage without submitting to the employer exploita-
tion and punitive state surveillance to which poor single mothers of color were 
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routinely subjected when they worked in low-wage jobs or applied for govern-
ment benefits.74 Mrs. Sylvester Smith challenged Alabama’s “substitute father” 
law, which denied public assistance to families headed by mothers who pursued 
intimate relationships outside of marriage. Smith claimed the freedom to engage 
in nonmarital sex without losing the government benefits that supplemented the 
meager wages she earned from full-time work as a cook.75 The women who re-
sisted laws that required poor unmarried mothers to disclose paternity or face 
fines and imprisonment asserted a right to sexual privacy and to the autonomy 
to make decisions based on their independent assessment of their children’s best 
interests.76 
Women who were engaged in challenges to the legal supremacy of marriage 
sought to redefine responsible citizenship to include single parenthood.77 Com-
munity activists such as Lois Fernandez of Philadelphia lobbied to reform the 
laws of “illegitimacy,” which stigmatized children and parents and withheld 
public and private benefits from nonmarital families.78 Fernandez declared sin-
gle motherhood a positive lifestyle worthy of respect and admiration; she 
proudly embraced her decision to parent alone as a voluntary choice.79 Aspiring 
educators challenged school districts that refused to hire unmarried parents in 
the aftermath of racial desegregation.80 They resisted dominant narratives about 
promiscuity and profligacy and reframed single mothers as heroic pioneers who 
pursued education and employment against all odds.81 
These reconstructive projects insisted that marital or birth status should not 
determine access to government-provided family benefits. Margaret Gonzales, 
for instance, sought the same Social Security “mother’s insurance benefits” for 
her children after the death of their nonmarital father that Stephen Wiesenfeld 
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won for married fathers.82 But these efforts were notably less successful than 
Ginsburg’s quest for formal legal equality for husbands and wives. When plain-
tiffs in family-status discrimination cases did succeed, it was largely because they 
persuaded courts that “hapless and innocent children” should not be punished 
for the “sins” of their parents.83 The capacious constitutional arguments women 
advanced—that family-status-based disadvantage discriminated based on race 
and poverty, subordinated women, denied parental autonomy, and limited sex-
ual and reproductive freedom—fell on deaf judicial ears.84 Marital supremacy 
survived, modified to afford some protection to blameless children and to 
women who could provide for their children without any help from the state.85 
For those who departed from norms of heterosexuality and gender conform-
ity, the late 1960s and early 1970s provided unprecedented hope for relief from 
the imposition of oppressive and punitive constraints. Movements for gay rights 
and liberation, lesbian feminism, and other alternatives to heterosexual nuclear-
family life flourished in the open.86 Pauli Murray’s public persona as a “Negro 
woman” who wrote poignantly about her mixed-race heritage masked private 
struggles with sexuality and gender identity throughout much of her earlier 
life.87 In the 1940s, Murray felt trapped in a woman’s body; she dressed and 
passed as a young man, and sought hormonal and other medical treatments to 
reconcile the conflict between physical and emotional beings.88 As a young adult, 
Murray married briefly “in an attempt to be a ‘normal woman,’” and suffered 
intermittently from severe emotional distress.89 Murray had a series of intense 
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love affairs with women that left her alternately exhilarated and bereft. By the 
1960s, Murray had found a way to live as a woman, secure in a happy and ful-
filling relationship with Renee Barlow, whom she met while working at the firm 
Paul Weiss in the 1950s.90 But the feeling of never quite belonging, of transcend-
ing categories of gender and race, informed Murray’s social and legal theoriz-
ing.91 Sex, like race, she insisted, should not limit a person’s life opportunities 
or dictate their social roles. 
Though Murray did not grapple publicly with “homosexuality” or “transsex-
uality” during these years, her conception of sex as largely irrelevant to a person’s 
capacities as a worker or citizen resonated with Americans who experienced dis-
crimination because they were gay, lesbian, or transgender. Sonia Pressman 
Fuentes, a pioneering feminist lawyer at the EEOC, publicly invited such 
claims.92 As the historian Margot Canaday has uncovered, in the early 1970s 
these workers filed sex-discrimination claims with the EEOC, and some regional 
offices accepted and resolved them.93 This success likely surprises modern read-
ers because growing resistance in the 1970s eroded the gains of advocates for 
racial justice, feminism, and gay rights and liberation. The EEOC backed away 
from its early receptiveness to gay and lesbian complainants in 1975, declaring 
that Title VII did not cover homosexuality;94 the Equal Rights Amendment en-
countered increasingly vocal and effective opposition;95 and a conservative juris-
prudence of race began to overtake earlier victories.96 By the end of the 1970s, 
momentum favored retrenchment: movements for racial justice, feminism, and 
gay liberation assumed a defensive posture. 
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i i i .  unfinished business:  political realignment and the 
legacies of intersectional advocacy 
The rise of conservatism and the partisan realignment that built to a cre-
scendo with Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election transformed the political landscape 
that Murray surveyed in 1964 when she reflected on the legacy of the abolition-
ist/feminist split over woman suffrage. As President Lyndon Johnson famously 
remarked hours after signing the Civil Rights Act, the Democrats had “delivered 
the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come”—though this parti-
san realignment took decades, rather than the months some white southern law-
makers predicted.97 The impact of the Voting Rights Act on black political par-
ticipation proved more immediate, as voter registration and office-holding 
among African Americans burgeoned.98 
Murray continued to promote an interracial, cross-class feminism even as 
more radical, countercultural, and separatist strands of activism flourished in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.99 In 1970, she maintained that “a ten percent minor-
ity, even if it were one hundred percent organized, cannot bring about a success-
ful transformation of society.”100 Even after black enfranchisement began to 
change the southern electorate, sheer numbers made white women’s support 
crucial to any successful struggle for racial justice and universal human rights, in 
Murray’s view.101 
Murray’s ambitions for an interracial feminist coalition enjoyed some suc-
cess, due in no small part to Title VII and other legislation and litigation—for 
which her legal theories and strategies laid the groundwork—uniting the fates 
of race and sex anti-discrimination laws.102 These alliances remained uneasy and 
subject to renegotiation, as many feminists of color articulated priorities distinct 
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from mainstream, white-dominated women’s organizations.103 The reproduc-
tive-justice movement reached beyond abortion rights to tackle coercive sterili-
zation, health-care access, and the economic deprivations that prevented poor 
and low-income Americans from raising their children in safe, flourishing com-
munities.104 Women of color who fought intimate-partner violence sought com-
munity-based approaches and remained skeptical of criminalization and state vi-
olence as a solution.105 Poor and low-income women struggled for access to jobs 
and better wages and working conditions; pink-collar workers tried to make in-
roads into blue-collar jobs as professional women sought access to elite employ-
ment.106  
To be sure, women’s interests across race, class, and citizenship status were 
not always aligned: anemic state support for families, lack of affordable child 
care, and other structural barriers meant that professional women’s success in 
the workplace often rested upon the undercompensated labor of poor and im-
migrant women of color.107 Women and men who deviated from normative mar-
ital heterosexuality faced daunting obstacles to family formation and flourishing, 
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and to gainful employment.108 Internal dissension sometimes overcame the co-
alition-building impulses that undergirded intersectional advocacy.109 
Nevertheless, an increasingly conservative political climate bound antiracist 
and feminist politicians and advocates together against a common adversary.110 
Phyllis Schlafly launched her crusade to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment in 
service of a longer-term effort to unite conservative Catholics and Protestants 
behind an antifeminist platform of “traditional family values” and transform the 
Republican Party.111 Like Murray, white southerners harbored regrets about the 
Reconstruction era, but their tragic touchstone was not the failure to win woman 
suffrage. Rather, they lamented the enfranchisement—and temporary electoral 
power—of freedmen.112 The impulse to invoke the inviolability of white wom-
anhood as a bulwark against racial and social change persisted as Jim Crow gave 
way to the New South. 
As it became less acceptable to warn of black enfranchisement’s threat to 
white supremacy, the dangers posed by secularism, feminism, and homosexual-
ity served similar political ends. The antifeminist values that Schlafly embodied 
found a receptive audience not only with conservative white men but also with 
many white Christian women, especially but not only in regions with a Confed-
erate cultural heritage.113 The STOP ERA movement Schlafly led connected 
“forced busing” with unisex bathrooms, compulsory employment and military 
service for women, welfare queens and delinquent children, and abortion and 
gay rights as the cultural apocalypse liberalism invited.114 In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the fusion of social and economic conservatism in the Republican 
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Party opened a partisan “gender gap,” in which the Democratic Party increas-
ingly won a disproportionate share of women’s votes, while the GOP attracted 
the majority of male voters. 
By the early twenty-first century, the “gender gap” had only widened. But 
media attention to gender alone obscured how race, region, religiosity, and mar-
ital status inflected Americans’ voting behavior. The 2016 election laid bare 
trends decades in the making: that the majority of white women voted for Don-
ald Trump did not surprise keen observers of electoral politics. In some regions 
and among some demographic groups, the gender gap barely registered. South-
ern white women had long voted for Republicans in numbers nearly equal to 
their male counterparts. The partisan gap between African American women and 
men proved similarly slight. And for all the focus on the gender gap, racially 
polarized voting, especially in the South, rendered “women” and “men” virtually 
meaningless as electoral categories.115 Marital status and education, too, cleaved 
(white) female voters. Married white women, especially those without a college 
degree, leaned Republican, while their unmarried and college-educated counter-
parts voted for Democrats. These outcomes were the result not merely of tactics 
pursued by Nixon, Reagan, and the conservative electoral strategists of the 
1970s. Rather, today’s electoral landscape derives from a concerted effort lasting 
over half a century. This “Long Southern Strategy” invoked threats to traditional 
gender roles, heterosexual hegemony, and conservative evangelical Christianity, 
along with white supremacy, to transform American politics.116 
While Murray’s vision of white-southern-female progressivism faltered in 
practice,117 her conviction that women of color would provide pivotal leadership 
for an American human-rights revolution found a lasting legacy. Social move-
ments such as #MeToo, the Movement for Black Lives, #SayHerName, the sanc-
tuary-cities and immigrant’-rights movements, revitalized voter-protection ef-
forts, ongoing reproductive-justice activism, prison and foster-care 
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abolitionism, criminal-justice reform, low-wage and domestic workers’ organ-
izing, to name a few, all continue this tradition.118 Murray created some of the 
first courses in Black and Women’s Studies at Brandeis in the late 1960s while 
supporting law reform and litigation on behalf of women’s rights. Today, 
scholar-activists continue to bring intersectional perspectives to enrich discourse 
and support grassroots efforts to uncover and combat injustice that transcend 
identity categories and recognize the inseparability of structural systems of op-
pression.119 Activists now strive openly, as Murray never felt she could,120 for 
safety and justice for people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identi-
ties.121 
In 1973, after the death of her life partner, Murray gave up her hard-won, 
tenured academic appointment at Brandeis to enter seminary and fulfill her 
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religious calling.122 Ordained in 1977 as the first African American female Epis-
copal priest, Murray developed a black feminist-liberationist theology that af-
firmed the inviolability and universality of human rights.123 Today, too, the pol-
itics of hatred and division that rend the fabric of American political life inspire 
the renewal of models of leadership that foster alliances and seek to alert citi-
zens—and aspiring citizens—to their common interests and values. A century 
after the Nineteenth Amendment and more than a half-century after suffrage, 
intersectional advocacy that bridges islands of identity and ideology flourishes 
in the words and deeds of Murray’s inheritors. “Hope,” Murray wrote in a poem 
published in 1970, “is a song in a weary throat.”124 Her words ring just as true 
fifty years later, as the unfinished business of equality and justice demands ur-
gent action now more than ever. 
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